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Abstract: This article explores the impact of the 2018 South Tyrolean election on the 
autonomous province’s consociational system of democracy. Implemented to tame 
centrifugal tendencies between the territory’s language groups (German, Italian and 
Ladin), this system has since the 1990s been losing its inclusive capacity. While the 
Italian-speaking electorate has increasingly been underrepresented in the main 
decision-making processes, the German-speaking intra-ethnic electoral arena 
experienced the rise of secessionist parties. The article shows that, despite major 
changes affecting party politics in South Tyrol, the outcome of the 2018 election 
contributed to restore stability to the consociational system.  
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The election to the provincial council, the Landtag, of the Autonomous Province of 
Bolzano/South Tyrol (hereafter South Tyrol), held on 21 October 2018, resulted in a major shift 
of power and important changes in the province’s consociational political system. The South 
Tyrolean Peoples’ Party (SVP), the main representative of the German- and Ladin-speaking 
minorities and regional key power player since 1945, for the first time in its history forms a 
government with an Italian-speaking right-wing party, the populist (Northern) League (LN). 
Despite gaining an absolute majority of seats up until 2013, the SVP has always ruled the 
territory in a coalition with a party representing the Italian national majority due to the 
consociational system, which establishes governmental inclusion of all linguistic groups. Yet 
in the past, it preferred to share power with Italian-speaking centre or centre-left parties. At the 
heart of these shifts in power relations lie major changes in the South Tyrolean parties and party 
system following up the 2018 elections. On the one hand, the decline in support for the South 
Tyrolean traditional governing parties, the SVP and the Democratic Party (PD), made the 
continuation of the incumbent coalition impossible. On the other hand, the changing 
preferences of the electorate led to the rise of new or reinvigorated challenger parties, such as 
the LN, which largely replaced the parties of the traditional opposition. 
The aim of this article is to explore the main political dynamics that led to those changes 
and to assess how they affect the configurations of the South Tyrolean consociational system 
of democracy. Implemented to tame centrifugal tendencies, this system has for a decade been 
losing its balance, with the rise of secessionist parties in the German-speaking intra-ethnic 
electoral arena and a growing underrepresentation of Italian-speakers in the main decision-
making processes. The article shows that, despite major processes of change affecting South 
Tyrolean politics, the outcome of the 2018 elections contributed to restore stability to the 
consociational system. Indeed, centrifugal tendencies have been weakened by the electoral 
losses of secessionist parties and the inclusion of all language groups has been improved. Not 
only have more Italian-speaking MPs moved into the Landtag, but also since the early 1990s a 
government party again represents an increasing percentage of the Italian-speaking electorate. 
Looking at theories of coalition formation, however, the article argues that the SVP-LN 
coalition has not only been formed on consociational principles, but also on strategic 
considerations and a convergence of policy positions. In the South Tyrolean two-dimensional 
political space, which is characterised by an economic and a territorial dimension of 





continuum. While Italian-speaking right-wing parties tended to favour re-centralization in the 
past, with the rise of the LN, an Italian-speaking right-wing party is now adopting a pro-
periphery position. South Tyrol’s autonomy is moving toward further integration and the 
strengthening of the principle of territoriality.  
The article is structured as follows. The next section introduces South Tyrol’s model of 
consociational democracy. Section three presents the most important South Tyrolean parties 
and their election campaign. The fourth section discusses the electoral results and analyses the 
impact they have had on South Tyrol’s autonomy. I conclude with a discussion on coalition 
formation. 
II. INSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT 
The Autonomous Province of Bolzano/South Tyrol is the northernmost province of Italy and, 
together with the Autonomous Province of Trento, forms one of the five Italian regions with a 
special statute (out of 20 regions). The call for self-determination in South Tyrol was essentially 
silenced after the Gruber-De Gasperi agreement (or Paris Agreement) in 1946. This bilateral 
agreement between Austria and Italy guaranteed the German- and Ladin-speaking minority 
rights and protection mechanisms. The unsatisfactory implementation of the agreement by the 
Italian state led to violent action and attracted the attention of the UN in the 1960s following 
the intervention from Austria as a ‘protecting power’. The negotiations culminated in the 
adoption of the Second Autonomy Statute in 1972. Through the transfer of the main legislative 
and administrative powers from the region to the province between then and 1992, when the 
conflict was finally settled, the Statute empowered South Tyrol with a high level of autonomy 
in financial, cultural and social matters.  
The South Tyrolean political system corresponds to the consociational model of democracy 
conceptualised by Arend Lijphard.1 In order to tame centrifugal tendencies, this model reduces 
political competition and secures cooperation between political elites through mechanisms of 
power sharing. Therefore, the distribution of political power in South Tyrol only partly reflects 
electoral results and the majority principle is replaced by mutual guarantees for the access to 
 
1 Günther Pallaver, “South Tyrol’s Consociational Democracy: Between Political Claim and Social 
Reality”, in Jens Woelk, Francesco Palermo and Joseph Marko (eds.), Tolerance through Law: Self 





and use of power between the relevant linguistic groups. Essentially, power sharing in South 
Tyrol refers to the following basic principles in the Autonomy Statute of 1948:2 
Maximum inclusion. The principle of inclusion expects the participation of all linguistic 
groups at the governmental level. Consequently, the provincial government always has to be 
composed according to the size of the linguistic groups represented in the provincial council. 
This principle is equally applied at all community levels and public representative entities. 
Proportional representation. The proportional representation of all linguistic groups in 
political organs is achieved through a proportional electoral system and a so called “ethnic quota 
system” (Ethnischer Proporz).3 The latter, moreover, distributes all public sector posts and 
funding according to language group percentages determined by the last census (Table 1). 
Veto power and decision-making autonomy. In questions, which are not of common interest 
(e.g. cultural and school autonomy) every language group enjoys decision-making autonomy. 
Veto-power is used when deciding on the defence of the vital interests of group protection 
and/or if established forms of conflict resolution are not sufficient.  
Table 1. Population in South Tyrol according to language group percentages (1900-2011)  
Year German Italian Ladin 
1900 88.8 4.0 4.0 
1910 89.0 2.9 3.8 
1921 75.9 10.6 3.9 
1961 62.2 34.3 3.4 
1971 62.9 33.3 3.7 
1981 64.9 28.7 4.1 
1991 67.9 27.6 4.3 
2001 69.1 26.4 4.3 
2011 69.4 26.0 4.5 
Source: South Tyrolean Institute of Statistics (ASTAT) 2018.  
Note: The remaining percentage points adding to 100 pertain to other linguistic groups. 
The consociational model of democracy at the level of the elites is strongly related to the 
ethnic division of the South Tyrolean society, resulting in a highly complex space of political 
competition. The South Tyrolean party system is characterized by a deep ethnic cleavage that 
 
2 Günther Pallaver, “South Tyrol's changing political system: from dissociative on the road to 
associative conflict resolution”, 42(3) Nationalities Papers (2014), 376-398.  
3 The ethnic quota assumes that all citizens declare themselves belonging to one of the three 
recognized language groups. It constitutes a subjective declaration of intent, which cannot be 





divides the electoral market into two ethnically distinct sub-arenas, whereby German- and 
Italian-speaking parties do not compete with each other for the most part. Traditional political 
conflicts (e.g. religion and class) have evolved alongside, either crosscutting or overlapping, a 
salient centre-periphery dimension.4 This complexity is compounded by the multilevel structure 
of the Italian state and its effects on the national and subnational party systems. The SVP, which 
sees itself as the “ethnic catch-all party for all German- and Ladin-speaking South Tyroleans”, 
has been the dominant party in South Tyrol, governing the province for 70 years with an 
absolute majority of seats up until 2013.5 This loss of an absolute majority constitutes the low 
point of a longer period of electoral decline, which, besides general trends in the transformation 
of regional politics, is due to the completion of its main policy goal (territorial autonomy) and 
the consequent erosion of the prioritized ethnic unity of the German and Ladin minorities above 
all other political conflicts. 
In such a context, the consociational system begun to lose balance due to enhanced 
centrifugal competition, as well as major changes in the principle of inclusion of all linguistic 
groups. The parties benefitting from the SVP’s electoral decline have up until now been right-
wing secessionist movements, which emerged in opposition to the SVP’s de facto abandonment 
of the right to self-determination after accepting the final conflict settlement in 1992. In their 
view, autonomy does not guarantee a permanent solution guaranteeing the linguistic-cultural 
survival of South Tyroleans in a foreign nation-state. The continuous electoral success of those 
parties puts pressure on the SVP’s centre-periphery agenda, confronting the party with a 
dilemma regarding the question of self-determination. The SVP’s realist autonomy policy, 
which rests upon a consensus with Austria and Italy, is not compatible with claims for 
secession. However, the party has responded to the challenge through a radicalization of 
demands from the central government, calling for “full autonomy”.6  
 
4 Matthias Scantamburlo, "Selbstbestimmung und Parteien in Südtirol: Territoriale und 
europäische Parteistrategien zwischen Autonomie und Sezession”, European Diversity and 
Autonomy Papers (2016) No. 3, 1-40.  
5 Matthias Scantamburlo and Günther Pallaver, “The 2013 South Tyrolean Election: The End of 
SVP Hegemony”, 24(4) Regional & Federal Studies (2014), 493-503.  
6 This strategy refers to reaching a maximum level of devolution by transferring all competences 
that are not assumed by the state (such as defence, foreign and monetary policy), including 
amongst others a full financial autonomy, an autonomous police force, and the capacity to 
conclude international agreements. Matthias Scantamburlo and Günther Pallaver, “Between 
Secession and ‘Full Autonomy’: Party Competition over Self-Determination in South Tyrol”, 






Changes in the principle of inclusion on the contrary refer to the under-representation of 
the Italian-speaking population in relevant decision-making processes, which are mainly rooted 
in the fragmentation of the Italian party system, as well as patterns of coalition formation. 
During the First Italian Republic7 the governing partners of the SVP, the Christian Democratic 
and Socialist Parties (DC and PSI respectively), always represented around 40 to 50% of the 
Italian-speakers. Centre-left governing parties since 1993, however, have not represented more 
than 30%. This does not refer to the aforementioned (formal) proportionality rule, which has 
always been taken into account, but rather to political representation. Considering the centre-
periphery compatibility of its coalition partners, the SVP has always ruled out parties critical 
toward autonomy, even when representing significant sectors of the Italian-speaking 
population. This was the case since the 1990s, when the majority of Italian-speakers voted for 
parties favouring re-centralization. Consequently, the exclusion from representation is the main 
driver concerning the feeling of so-called “Italian discomfort” (disagio).  
While both dynamics have different roots, they question the legitimacy of the political 
system concerning the balance of power between the language groups. Before looking at how 
the 2018 election results affected those dynamics, the next section discusses the main South 
Tyrolean parties and their election campaign. 
III. POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN 
Since the political landscape of South Tyrol is characterised by a centre-periphery dimension, 
regionalist parties dominate the South Tyrolean party system. Regionalist parties are parties 
whose political agenda is the defence of a particular territory within the nation-state. They form 
the regionalist or peripheral party family, as they arise from the centre-periphery cleavage and, 
unlike regional branches of state-wide parties, they organize exclusively in their peripheral 
territory.8  
Regionalist parties in South Tyrol pertain almost entirely to the German-speaking intra-
ethnic electoral arena, which is characterised by processes of “ethnic outbidding” between the 
moderate-conservative and autonomist South Tyrolean Peoples Party (SVP) and its right-wing 
 
7 The Italian political system underwent major changes in the 1990s so that observers distinguish 
between a First Republic (1946-1992) and a Second Republic (from 1993). The main differences 
concern the electoral market and the government/opposition dynamics in the parliamentary 
arena.  
8 Sonia Alonso, Challenging the State: Devolution and the Battle for Partisan Credibility. A 





secessionist counterparts the Freedom Party (DF), the South-Tyrolean Freedom (STF) and the 
small Citizens Union (BU). The STF emerged in 2007 to campaign for a referendum on self-
determination with the aim of reuniting the historical Tyrol (i.e. north and south) under a 
common Austrian roof. The DF, on the contrary, was modelled on the right-wing populist 
Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) and became the SVP’s major challenger, promoting the creation 
of an independent South Tyrolean free state. In the run-up to the 2018 election, this constellation 
changed with the rise of Team Köllensperger (TK), named after the main leader and former 
Five Star Movement (M5S) candidate Paul Köllensperger. The TK is clearly inspired by the 
tradition of non-partisan (or civic) lists that have grown considerably at the local level since the 
1990s and reflects the increasing distrust in traditional political actors. Contrary to the 
territorially based Greens (GVV), who organize inter-ethnically, the TK can be considered as a 
German-speaking party.9 Like the SVP, it adopts a pro-autonomy position and rejects 
independence.  
Though dominated by regional branches of state-wide parties, the Italian-speaking intra-
ethnic arena reflects the national party system and has adopted a tri-polar type of competition. 
This has occurred in light of the electoral growth of the Five Star Movement (M5S), which, 
since 2013, has challenged both the Italian traditional left and right. The centre-left pole is 
occupied by the Democratic Party (PD) and to some extent by the Greens, who have also gained 
support in the Italian-speaking intra-ethnic arena. The major parties pertaining to the centre-
right are Forward Italy (FI), the Northern League (LN) and Alto Adige in the Heart (AAnC). 
The AAnC can be considered as a territorial list and the main successor of the state-wide 
nationalist party National Alliance (AN). Although party competition mainly takes place on the 
economic left-right dimension, the centre-left parties have historically adopted autonomy 
friendly positions, whereas the centre-right has been hostile towards more autonomy from 
Rome, with the notable exception of the LN. Despite being a pro-federalist party, the LN never 
played an important role in South Tyrol as the claim to represent the whole of the Italian North 
(i.e. Padania) was not supported in the territory (at the 2013 election it did not even participate 
on its own, but within the right-wing coalition Team Autonomy (TA) obtaining just 2.5%). Yet 
it’s transformation into a state-wide populist radical right party under the leadership of Matteo 
 
9 The list is externally perceived as German-speaking, the internal and external communication 
language is predominantly German, and its members and voters come almost exclusively from the 





Salvini has made it an important player within South Tyrol’s Italian-speaking electorate in the 
run-up to the 2018 election. 
Figure 1. Party system agenda in South Tyrol 2013-2018. 
 
Source: Regional Manifestos Project.  
Figure 2. Saliency scores of general issues in 2018 South Tyrolean parties’ manifestos.  
 





In order to account for the issues deemed most important for the South Tyrolean parties’ 
2018 campaign, this article uses data from the content analysis of their electoral manifestos. 
More concretely, I rely on the data of the Regional Manifestos Project (RMP), an adaption of 
the Manifesto Project’s (MP) methodology for the analysis of multilevel polities.10 Figure 1 
shows the most salient issues in the South Tyrolean party system.11 In their manifestos, the 
parties dedicated most space to welfare and the environment. Issues pertaining to the traditional 
themes, such as the economy, nationalism or the territorial debate were less important in 2018, 
although they still figure strongly compared to other topics. As expected, immigration and the 
investment in infrastructure and technology were also highly discussed. Comparing the party 
system agenda with the past election of 2013, welfare, immigration, infrastructure, 
administration, education and culture were those issues that gained higher in 2018. The 
traditional issues of nation-building, the territorial debate and, to a lesser extent, the economy, 
have lost relevance, as well as the debate over the renewal of the province’s democratic 
practices.  
Looking at the differences between political parties (for a detailed comparison between 
2013 and 2018 see Table A2 in the appendix) one can observe that nationalism and the territorial 
debate were of major importance among the German-speaking regionalist parties. As already 
observed in past elections,12 the secessionist parties STF and DF put more emphasis on nation 
building, and the SVP focused more on issues concerning competences (territorial debate). In 
addition to this, the focus on international relations (with Austria) and agriculture as important 
issues for their traditional voter bases differentiated them from their Italian-speaking 
counterparts. As to be expected, the Greens gave more space to issues concerning 
environmental protection (30%) in their 2018 manifesto than any other party. The new 
challengers TK and M5S, and partly also the LN, stood out for their campaign for a regeneration 
of democratic practices (between 12% and 15% of the manifesto). Italian-speaking 
 
10 Sonia Alonso, Braulio Gómez and Laura Cabeza, “Measuring Centre-Periphery Preferences: The 
Regional Manifestos Project”, in 23(2) Regional & Federal Studies (2013), 189-211. For further 
explanation about methodology and coding scheme see: <www.regionalmanifestosproject.com>.  
11 For the analysis, I grouped the RMP 76 policy categories into 16 general issues following the 
examples of the RMP team. In order to describe the “issue package” of a party, it is better to 
aggregate some of the more specific categories of the classification scheme into broader issues, 
which should not differ excessively in terms of their generality. See: Sonia Alonso, Laura Cabeza 
and Braulio Gómez, “Disentangling peripheral parties’ issue packages in subnational elections”, 
15(2) Comparative European Politics (2017), 240-263. 
12 Matthias Scantamburlo, “Partiti e autodeterminazione in Alto Adige/Südtirol. Competizione 





establishment (AAnC and PD) and challenger (LN and M5S) parties differentiated themselves 
especially according to the latter’s dismissal of economic issues. While LN and M5S both 
strongly focused on welfare, the LN, more than any other party, campaigned on (and against) 
immigration (27.5% of the manifesto).  
IV. ELECTION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The Landtag election of 21 October 2018 saw the participation of 73.9% of the eligible voting 
population (the lowest figure ever in the history of South Tyrol, 3.8% down on the then all-time 
low turnout in 2013). According to Table 2, the party that received the most votes was the SVP, 
which, in line with pre-electoral expectations, gathered 41.9% of the popular vote. Losing 3.8% 
of the previous vote and only winning 15 seats (compared to 17 in 2013), the SVP continues its 
slow but continuous decline. It still, however, managed to avoid finishing under the important 
threshold of 40%. The main winner of the election was the TK, which became the provincial 
council’s second party, gathering 15.2% of the votes and 6 seats. Although the party presented 
itself as inter-ethnic movement, all 6 seats went to candidates from the German linguistic group, 
thus heavily affecting the party’s coalition potential. 
Table 2. Summary of the 2018 South Tyrolean Landtag election results 
Party  
Popular Votes Seats 
Votes % +/- Seats +/- 
SVP 
South Tyrolean Peoples Party 
119.109 41.9 -3.8 15 -2 
TK 
Team Köllensperger 
43.315 15.2 +15.2 6 +6 
LN 
Northern League – League  
31.515 11.1 +8.6 4 +3 
GVV 
The Greens 
19.392 6.8 -1.9 3 = 
DF 
Freedom Party 
17.620 6.2 -11.8 2 -4 
STF 
South-Tyrolean Freedom 
16.927 6.0 -1.2 2 -1 
PD 
Democratic Party 
10.808 3.8 -2.9 1 -1 
M5S 
Five Star Movement 
6.670 2.4 -0.1 1 = 
AAnC-FdI 
Alto Adige in the Heart – Brothers of Italy 
4.882 1.7 -0.4 1 = 
Voter turnout 282.878 73.9 -3.8   
Source: Electoral results, Provincial Council of the Autonomous Province of South Tyrol.  





Table 3. Volatility and Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties (ENPP) (1988-2018) 
 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008 2013 2018 
Volatility 17.45 22.3 14.75 13.6 24.6 21.75 28.35 
ENPP 2.37 3.09 2.63 2.60 3.28 3.49 4.12 
Source: Electoral results, Provincial Council of the Autonomous Province of South Tyrol.  
Note: Volatility is calculated according to the Pedersen Index of Electoral Volatility. The Effective 
Number of Parliamentary Parties (ENPP) is calculated according to Laakso and Taagepera’s Index. 
Amongst the winners, the LN must certainly be mentioned, with an increase of 8.6% of the 
popular vote vis-à-vis 2013 (when it ran inside the Italian-speaking centre-right coalition Team 
Autonomy) and now the largest political force amongst Italian-speaking parties. The main 
losers of the election were the German-speaking secessionist parties. The most impressive 
breakdown was that of the DF, which lost 11.7% (from 17.9% down to 6.2%), won only 2 seats 
(compared to 6 in 2013) and returned to the performances of the early 1990s, when the party 
split from the SVP. The STF did not lose many votes (–1.2%) but failed to obtain a third 
mandate. The smallest secessionist party, BU, for the first time failed to obtain representation. 
When it comes to the losers, one cannot avoid Italian-speaking mainstream parties. The PD 
dropped back to 3.8% (–2.9% as compared to 2013) and obtained the worst result in its (short) 
history. Although numerically this was enough for it to score as the second Italian-speaking 
party, the loss of one mandate heavily weakened its potential as a coalition partner. Its right-
wing counterpart FI did even worse and did not move into the Landtag.  
The political situation after the 2018 election is marked more by change than continuity. 
Although the trend towards an increasing volatility and fragmentation of the party system (see 
Table 3), as well as the electoral decline of the dominant SVP, have been constant features of 
South Tyrolean politics since 2003, the outcome of the 2018 election inverted different trends 
that had become visible over the last couple of years. First, contrary to past elections, all parties 
of the establishment have been punished, while new challenger parties have become serious 
competition. Second, the German-speaking secessionist parties, which were on a continuous 
rise over the last 15 years, have lost mass support. Third, a higher number of Italian-speaking 
MPs entered the Landtag, thus improving the representation of Italian-speakers. In order to 
account for those processes and evaluate their impact on the consociational system, different 





A. Establishment Parties vs. (New) Challengers 
Looking at the electoral results, we can see that the only parties to increase their vote share were 
new or renewed in their agenda. All other parties lost votes. In this respect, an increasing distrust 
of traditional party actors and processes shaped the 2018 election. According to the last survey 
on citizen satisfaction with public services, trust in the political class continues to be amongst 
the lowest categories and only one citizen in three feels involved in the provincial decision-
making processes.13 The lack of alternation in regional office for extremely long periods, as in 
the case of South Tyrol, raises questions about democracy, making the regeneration of 
democratic practices an area of political competition. Major political or economic crises can 
increase such a dimension and accelerate pre-existing long-term processes of party system 
change.14 While growing distrust towards politics in South Tyrol can be traced back to the 
beginning of the economic crisis,15 the pension scandal of 2014, where pension reforms allowed 
politicians to claim up to millions of euros, cast a long shadow over the whole political 
establishment.16 Indeed, voters did not only punish the governing parties, but also, and more 
fundamentally, they defected from the main traditional opposition. TK’s transformative agenda 
resonated with voters by offering something that the traditional opposition could not offer 
anymore: democratic renewal (see section 3).  
B. Autonomy vs. Secession 
Strongly connected to the growing disaffection towards traditional parties is the change in 
political structuring and its effects on traditional political divides in driving voters’ choices. In 
South Tyrol, the traditional left-right dynamic has evolved along a salient centre-periphery 
dimension, shaping political competition. If we look at the South Tyrolean party system with 
regards to proximity or distance to autonomy, it becomes clear that a centrifugal tendency has 
been visible over the last two decades, with an enhanced competition around the centre-
 
13 ASTAT "Zufriedenheit der Bürger mit den öffentlichen Diensten“, Astat Info No. 55, September 
2018, at <https://astat.provinz.bz.it>.  
14 Matthias Scantamburlo, Alonso Sonia and Braulio Gómez, “Democratic Regeneration in 
European Peripheral Regions: New Politics for the Territory?” 41(3) West European Politics 
(2018), 615-639. 
15 Gernot Gruber, “Zwei Landtagswahlen im Lichte der Meinungsforschung“, in Günther Pallaver 
(eds.) Politika14. Südtiroler Jahrbuch für Politik (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2014), 195-224. 
16 When the privileged procedures became known a storm of indignation rose in civil society 
addressing all parties, government and opposition alike, because all MPs had or would had 
benefitted from the reform. Only the M5S, which was elected in 2013, thus after the reform, had 





periphery dimension.17 While secessionist parties accounted for 27% of the popular vote in 
2013, those parties only reached 12% in 2018.18 With the rise of the TK, which adopts an 
autonomist position, voter support in the German-speaking intra-ethnic arena has moved away 
from secession and now orients itself more towards the status quo. The causes for such an 
evolution partly stem from territorial and anti-establishment politics and the SVP’s successful 
centre-periphery agenda. The violations of South Tyrol’s constitutionally guaranteed financial 
autonomy amid Italian post-crisis austerity efforts during the technocratic Monti government 
(2011-2013) caused political discontent with the SVP’s territorial agenda and strengthened the 
DF’s and STF’s framing of the anti-establishment rhetoric in secessionist terms. The SVP’s 
“full autonomy” discourse since 2013, combined with successful negotiations at the national 
level,19 not only provided security from centralist tendencies, but also permitted the argument 
that South Tyrol’s autonomy was on a better footing than it was before. Thus, it gave credibility 
to the autonomist path and the possibility to negotiate for further competences. Moreover, with 
the rise of the TK the German-speaking electorate, for the first time, had a new and viable 
autonomist alternative to the SVP.  
C. Representation of Italian-speakers 
The principle of the maximum inclusion of all language groups in the decision-making process 
has undergone profound changes in the past two decades due to radical changes in Italian party 
politics. Interrelated causes such as the strong party fragmentation, the decline in turnout among 
the Italian-speaking electorate and a decline in the coalition potential of Italian-speaking parties 
led to an underrepresentation of the Italian-speakers in decision-making institutions in terms of 
their numerical strength. One main consequence of such development has been the feeling of 
“Italian discomfort” (disagio). In 2013 the number of Italian-speaking MPs dropped to five, 
which resulted in only one representative in the South Tyrolean government20, but this increased 
to eight after the 2018 elections, enabling the Italian group to send two representatives to the 
government again. With two representatives in nine, the Italian language group is represented 
 
17 Scantamburlo op.cit. note 5. 
18 Scantamburlo and Pallaver op.cit. note 6. 
19 E.g. the “security pact”, a financial agreement to prevent the arbitrary access of the state to 
provincial funds, or the “safeguard clause”, which exempted South Tyrol from Prime Minister 
Renzi’s failed centralist constitutional reform. Although the majority of the Italian population 
rejected the reform in a referendum held in 2016, with 63.7% of the votes in favour (6% higher 
than any other province) South Tyrol was the strongest supporter of the constitutional reform.  






at 22.2% in the provincial executive, slightly below its numerical strength of 26% (according 
to the 2011 census), but a huge improvement on the previous 12.5%. Such an improvement in 
political influence is mainly owed to the electoral success of the LN. Indeed, it collected almost 
all the votes received in the past by the Italian-speaking right-wing parties, the AN and FI, thus 
reunifying the Italian-speaking centre-right electoral space. While the rise of the TK led to a 
shift towards more moderate positions in the German-speaking intra-ethnic arena, on both the 
territorial and economic dimensions, with the success of the LN and the losses of the PD, the 
Italian intra-ethnic arena again shifted towards the right. However, given its past federalist and 
generally autonomy friendly positions, contrary to the former elections, for the first time an 
Italian-speaking right-wing party had a stronger coalition potential. This, as I show below, has 
had important implications for government formation. 
To sum up, concerning the consociational system of democracy, the changing political 
dynamics had a differential impact. In the German-speaking arena, the rise of new challengers 
and the changing dynamics in party competition contributed to a further reduction in the SVP’s 
dominance and consequently its ability to represent the German-speaking community. Yet, after 
years of centrifugal tendencies, with the rise of the TK, competition moved towards a centripetal 
dynamic. As a result, the polarization concerning autonomy has decreased and exit options have 
partly been replaced by loyalty. The realignments in the Italian-speaking arena had quite the 
opposite effect. With the mechanics of the party system remaining stable, the rise of the LN 
mainly replaced the former right-wing parties and contributed to an increase in the number of 
Italian-speaking MPs. Consequently, despite the SVP’s decreasing ability to dominate the 
German-speaking constituency, the centripetal dynamics and the increasing number of Italian-
speaking MPs point to a stabilization of the consociational system.  
V. GOVERNMENT FORMATION  
According to the Autonomy Statute of 1948, all linguistic groups have to be represented in the 
South Tyrolean government according to their proportional strength in the provincial council. 
With eight mandates in the provincial council after the election of 21 October, the Italian group 
is by law entitled to two seats in the government. In addition, a gender quota establishes two 
seats for female representatives. Special rules apply to the Ladin group, which has a guaranteed 
right to be represented in the provincial council, but needs at least two deputies to get a seat in 





the SVP, so that after decades they now had the right to be represented in the provincial 
government on their own terms.21 
As the strongest party, the SVP needed an Italian-speaking coalition partner to form a 
government. Taking into account the principle of ethnic proportionality in the past two 
legislatures, the SVP formed a coalition with the PD but the outcome of the 2018 election 
produced no majority for such a possibility. The only feasible coalitions were either with the 
LN, which was the party elected by the majority of Italian-speakers, or a coalition with the PD 
and the Greens, since the Greens sent one Italian-speaking representative to the Landtag. A 
third variant would have been an Italian-speaking party entering government without a coalition 
agreement.22  
For the SVP both combinations brought about political dilemmas. The biggest problem of 
a coalition with the LN was its position on the EU and its right-wing populist character. While 
the LN is a Eurosceptic party, the SVP is decidedly Europhile. Moreover, the SVP is quite far 
away from the LN’s anti-immigrant discourse. On the other hand, a coalition with the Greens 
and the PD would have represented a much smaller section of the Italian linguistic group. The 
SVP also has big reservations about the Green’s inter-ethnic character (i.e. conflict about 
bilingual schools). After the first discussion rounds with the three parties, the SVP party steering 
committee voted in favour to open negotiations with the LN (65 votes in favour, 11 against and 
7 abstentions). The prerequisite for starting negotiations, however, was the LN’s explicit 
commitment to democratic values, the further development of autonomy and to a Europe of the 
Regions as a guarantee of security, peace and prosperity.23 After longer negotiations (and 
rejections by the LN), these commitments were introduced in the preamble of the coalition 
agreement. On 8 January 2019, the coalition agreement was signed by the leaders of all 
participating parties, and on 25 January the Landtag elected Arno Kompatscher to his second 
term as governor – three months after the election. The SVP-LN government, for the first time 
since the final conflict settlement in 1992, represents a higher number of the Italian-speaking 
voting population in South Tyrol (see Table 3).  
 
21 If the Ladin minority group does not get at least two seats the possibility of co-opting into the 
provincial government is still given but requires a two-thirds majority.  
22 Such a solution existed for a short time during the legislature period from 1973 to 1978.  






Table 4. Vote share of Italian-speaking governing parties according to the Italian-speaking 
voting population 
Legislature German- and Ladin-





1948-1952 SVP DC, PRI 42,7 
1952-1956 SVP DC 38,9 
1956-1960 SVP DC 40,4 
1960-1964 SVP DC 38,9 
1964-1968 SVP DC, PSDI 44,8 
1968-1973 SVP DC 39 
1973-1978 SVP DC, PSI 53,7 
1978-1983 SVP DC, PSDI 40,2 
1983-1988 SVP DC, PSI 42,1 
1988-1993 SVP DC, PSI 40,2 
1993-1998 SVP PPI, PDS 23,3 
1998-2003 SVP DS, PPI, Centro 27,8 
2003-2008 SVP PeD, UA 27,6 
2008-2013 SVP PD 23,9 
2013-2018 SVP PD 29,5 
2018- SVP LN 44,6 
Source: Adapted from Günther Pallaver, “Das politische System Südtirols: Komplexe Machtteilung und 
ethnische Einflussspähren”, in: Hermann Atz, Max Haller and Günther Pallaver (eds.), Ethnische 
Differenzierung und soziale Schichtung in der Südtiroler Gesellschaft (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2016), 
61-80.  
From the perspective of the consociational principle of the maximum inclusion of language 
groups, the LN’s government participation has contributed even further to bringing the Italian-
speaking population back into the system and thereby to its stabilization. After the 2018 
election, the Italian-speaking government party represents 44.6% of its own segment, a quota 
that was last reached in the 1970s. While the representation of the linguistic groups is an 
important factor, it explains only a part of the story about the patterns of coalition formation. In 
order to account for them, it is worth bearing in mind strategic considerations concerning 
coalition formation. Political parties may be assumed to seek three interrelated goals: votes, 
office and policy, all of them having straightforward implications for the formation of 
government coalitions.24 Parties should attempt to form coalitions that do not harm them 
electorally, and that allow them to control as many cabinet posts as possible and implement as 
many of their policy proposals as possible. How parties weight these different priorities is 
dependent on the political context.25 Leaving aside the South Tyrolean peculiarities, such as the 
 
24 Kaare Strøm and Wolfgang C. Müller (eds.), Policy, Office, or Votes? How Political Parties in 
Western Europe Make Hard Decisions (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999). 
25 Wolfgang C. Müller, “Government formation”, in Todd Landmann and Neil Robinson (eds.), The 





ethnic representation principle and the a priori rejection of parties rejecting autonomy, actual 
patterns of government formation in multi-level democracies can expect coalitions if they (1) 
consist of a small number of parties (2) are characterised by a low heterogeneity of parties’ 
policy positions in key dimensions (3) are congruent with coalitions at other government 
levels.26 
Figure 3. Party policy positions 2013-2018 on the centre-periphery and left-right dimensions. 
 
Source: Regional Manifestos Project. 
Note: In 2013 the LN participated within the coalition Team Autonomy (TA).  
While it is difficult to weight the different priorities in the case of the 2018 negotiations, a 
coalition between SVP and LN was the most likely one from a strategic perspective. Forming 
an executive with the Greens and the PD would have consisted of a greater number of parties, 
a higher heterogeneity of policy positions in key dimensions and would have been less 
congruent with the coalition at the national level. Figure 3 shows the evolution of party policy 
 
26 Thomas Bräuninger, Marc Debus, Jochen Müller and Christian Stecker, “Party Competition and 
Government Formation in Germany: Business as Usual or New Patterns?”, in 28 (1) German 





positions on the two traditional conflict dimensions characterising political competition in 
South Tyrol, the socioeconomic left-right and the centre-periphery dimensions, between 2013 
and 2018.27 According to Figure 3, the gap between the SVP and the Greens was still too wide 
after the 2018 elections, on both the left-right and the centre-periphery dimensions. The LN’s 
positions on the contrary seemed to be far more compatible with those of the SVP. Both parties 
occupy the political space on the right and on the pro-periphery side of the continuum and they 
are closer to one another as to any other party. Although new conflict dimensions, such as 
immigration, have increased and the position on the EU is a major conflict point, the centre-
periphery and economic dimensions of competition continue to be the most important ones for 
the SVP and consequently the LN was the most likely option for a governing coalition.  
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The aim of this article was to explore the main changes in the South Tyrolean parties and party 
system following up to the 2018 elections and to explore their impact on the consociational 
system of democracy. The outcomes of the 2018 elections confirmed different processes of 
change, which make South Tyrol more similar to other European (minority) regions. The SVP, 
which up until 2008 had always gathered an absolute majority of votes, continued its electoral 
decline, falling to a historical low point of 40%. This shows that ethnic unity between the 
German and Ladin minorities above all other political conflicts has become more fragile. The 
citizens base their voting primarily on subjective political interests and preferences, and less on 
ethnic criteria. This trend is confirmed by an increasing electoral volatility, the fragmentation 
of the party system, the decline of traditional party loyalties and the rise of (new) challenger 
parties.  
Concerning the configuration of the consociational system of democracy, the situation after 
the 2018 election is marked by an increasing stability, as different trends affecting its balance 
have been inverted. First, the massive loss in support for the German-speaking secessionist 
parties and the rise of the new party TK, which clearly adopts an autonomist position and has 
helped tame the centrifugal dynamics visible over the past decade. Second, the higher number 
of Italian-speaking MPs in the Landtag and the SVP-LN coalition, which since the early 1990s 
represents an increasing percentage of Italian-speakers, have significantly improved the 
principle of maximum inclusion of the language groups. This improvement, however, is 
 
27 The dimensions are measured according to the established, though no doubt controversial, 
right-left (RILE) and the centre-periphery (CP) variable, operationalised by the RMP team and 





accompanied by the decreasing ability of the SVP to represent the German-speaking 
community. Ultimately, the new executive rests also on a convergence in party policy positions, 
with a particular novelty being the pro-peripheral position of an Italian-speaking right-wing 
party. 
While these developments point towards a further integration between the three language 
groups and the strengthening of the territoriality principle, the consequences of accommodating 
the agenda of a right-wing populist party like the LN, which favours the integration of the 







Table A1: General policy issues 
General issue RMP’s policy categories (codes)* 
International Relations 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110 
Territorial Debate 1017, 1027, 203, 204, 301, 3012, 3013, 3014, 302  
Administrative Efficiency 303 
Democracy  202, 2024, 2025, 304,  









Welfare  504, 505 
Nation Building 601, 6015, 6016, 6017, 602, 608, 606, 7054 
Moral Values 603, 604 
Law & Order 605 
Immigration 607, 608, 5032, 5042, 5051, 5062, 5071, 6051, 7053 
Agriculture  703 
Economy 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 
411, 4111, 412, 413, 414, 415, 701, 702, 704 
*For a full list of the categories’ definitions and their respective codes, please visit the RMP project’s 
website: www.regionalmanifestosproject.com . 
 
Table A2. Change in general policy issue salience by party (2013-2018) 
Party DF STF SVP GVV PD M5S LN AAnC 
Welfare 4.37 -1.57 2.65 -0.49 2.62 14.95 4.25 9.24 
Environment -9.13 3.43 0.62 5.76 3.56 -11.28 -8.22 10.24 
Economy 3.57 3.64 -1.46 -4.77 3.06 -15.64 -7.74 8.24 
Nation Building 6.37 -13.37 -1.05 0.54 -3.16 10.25 -7.90 -26.04 
Immigration -1.53 -0.84 2.51 2.54 0.61 0.87 20.69 -3.43 
Infrastructure -0.24 1.55 2.72 -4.33 6.99 -1.34 4.59 1.93 
Equality -3.69 -2.19 -5.17 8.51 2.47 -0.99 -6.85 2.42 
Administrative Efficiency 2.15 5.21 -0.21 -0.18 0.31 6.67 6.04 -1.99 
Culture 9.01 0.00 0.52 4.56 -0.48 -1.72 -6.85 9.75 
Democracy -7.58 -4.28 -1.99 -5.54 -3.13 -5.38 2.98 -7.85 
Territorial Debate -1.09 1.87 -2.50 -1.12 -13.92 -1.72 -1.37 -6.38 
Agriculture -3.89 5.52 3.87 -6.39 0.62 0.26 -2.74 0.00 
Law & Order -1.80 -0.84 2.34 0.00 0.62 5.56 -2.66 3.90 
International Relations 4.10 2.71 -2.81 0.88 0.31 -0.25 0.00 0.00 
Rule of Law 0.06 -0.11 0.95 -0.16 -1.57 -0.25 4.35 -0.01 
Moral Values -0.95 -0.73 -0.24 0.18 1.09 0.00 1.45 0.98 
Source: Regional Manifestos Project. 







Table A3. Calculation of scales 
The left-right (RILE) scale:  
right (XX_104 + XX_201 + 30_203 + XX_305 + XX_401 + XX_402 + XX_407 + XX_414 
+ XX_505 + XX_507 + XX_603 + XX_605 + XX_606) - 
left (XX_103 + XX_105 + XX_106 + XX_107 + XX_403 + XX_404 + XX_406 + XX_412 
+ XX_413 + XX_701 + XX_202 + XX_2024 + XX_2025) 
The centre-periphery (CP) scale:  
periphery (22_YYY + 22_YYYY + 31_YYY + 31_YYYY + 20_301 + 20_3013 + 20_3014 
+ 30_301 + 20_601 + 20_6015 + 20_6016 + 20_608 + 30_602) - 
centre (32_YYY + 32_YYYY + 21_YYY + 21_YYYY + 20_302 + 30_302 + 30_601 + 
30_6015 + 30_6016 + C30_608) 
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